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Abstract
Our trading strategy is inspired from the paper ’implied volatility indices as
leading indicators of stock index returns?’, Giot (2002,[3]). It uses stylized
facts observed in stock markets: the so called ’leverage effect’, the clustering
and the mean-reverting behaviour of the implied volatility. Based on S&P100
and VIX data, we show that abnormally high levels of volatility can be used as
a trading signals for long traders. A bootstrap procedure conﬁrms the signiﬁ-
cant returns for the 1986-2003 period.
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Many studies have shown that the volatility is time dependent and follows a mean reverting process. In
addition we observe that the volatility ﬂuctuates cyclically around a certain mean level which varies over
time. This stylized fact is referred as the ’volatility clustering’.
We recall that the ’leverage effect’ has its origin in the observation that volatility is negatively correlated
with stock returns. The ﬁrst explanation to this empirical fact was given by Black and Christie (see [1],
[2]) in the sense that negative returns increase ﬁnancial leverage which extend the risk of the company
and therefore its volatility. Another possible explanation to the negative correlation is, that the fear
induced by an increase of volatility produces a fall of demand and hence a price decrease.
Our trading strategyis based upon the above mentioned properties. We detect periods of abnormally high
(low) volatility and take a long (short) position accordingly. The position is kept open until the volatility
returns to a ’normal’ level. Gains should arise from negative correlation between returns and volatility.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data used for our analysis.
Section 3 explains the methodology of our trading strategy and presents the results for our long and
short strategy. In section 4 we compare results to other quantile based strategies and apply a bootstrap
performance measure. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Data used
We test our trading strategy on daily closing values of the S&P100 index. Since volatility is a basis for
our trading strategy, we need to deﬁne it. The ﬁrst candidate is the historical volatility. Many studies
have shown the poor quality of prevision of this estimator and its poor ability to react quickly on new
information (see [5],[8]). In addition, as the construction of this proxy depends on the observation
window, estimations can vary signiﬁcantly, and hence would not represent the general view of investors.
Therefore we decide to focus on an other indicator. The implied volatility is the next natural candidate.
This indicator does not overperform the historical approach (see [7],[6]) but has many advantages. First
as it is implied from activelytraded options, it represents thebest assessment by investorson theexpected
future volatility. Second, a common volatility index is computed continuously by the CBOE c
￿ and is
freely provided to investors. For these reasons we use the S&P100 implied volatility index, the VIX.
Since the VIX index started on the 2-JAN-1986, we use the complete history until the 28-MAR-2003 for




S&P100 (pts) 4339 329 208.8 98.36 832.65
VIX (%) 21.7 8.34 9.04 150.19
Table 1: Some statistics on data
The table 1 presents the number of observations, the mean, the volatility, the minimum and the maximum value of S&P100 and
VIX indices. The observation window ranges from 2-JAN-1986 to 28-MAR-2003.
32.2 Data analysis
To show an example of the negative correlation between stock and volatility, we compute continuous
returns2 of both indices for the whole period. The ﬁgure 1 shows a clear negative cross-sectional correla-
tion between the two returns. A linear regression exhibits a negative slope at a level of -0.83 (t-stat=-70)
and a R
2 of 54%.









































Figure 1: negative correlation
Figure 1 presents a scatter plot of daily stock returns and daily abnormal volatility returns over the whole observation window.
The slope of the linear regression is -0.83. The R
2 is 54%
To use the empirical fact of negative correlation as a trading signal, we need to predict future volatility
movements. The underlying idea is to use the mean-reversion which implies that in extremely high (low)
volatility periods, there is a high probability of a return to ’normal’ levels. To quantify normal levels of














From therewe quantifythelevel ofabnormal volatility(AV) byits positionin thehistoricaldistribution.4.





































4quantiles at 99% ; 95% ; 90% ... ; 5% ; 1%




































Figure 2: VIX index and abnormal volatility
This ﬁgure 2 presents the evolution of the implied volatility index VIX (above) and the abnormal volatility computed using a
moving average window of 250 days. The observation window ranges from 2-JAN-1986 to 28-MAR-2003
3 Trading strategy and results
To test the power of our leading indicator for future index returns, we deﬁne a long (short) strategy based
on abnormally high (low) volatility periods.
3.1 Description of the strategy
Our strategy going long in the index is based on the idea that investors are mean variance optimizers.
When the abnormal implied volatility increases, the expected Sharpe ratio of the stock universe decreases
which could be interpreted as a signal that investors will go out of stock market. At this point, the volatil-
ity increases even more (leverage effect) and reaches the highest quantiles of it’s implied distribution.
Then, the mean reversion property of the implied volatility enters and drags the volatility back to ’nor-
mal’ levels, leading to an increased stock value. For this reason, the abnormal implied volatility is our
sole source of information. We decompose our strategy in 4 phases depending on the AV level:
1. AV is low
! wait
2. AV reaches the 99th quantile
! warning
3. AV decreases under the 99th quantile
! buy one index
4. AV decreases under the 85th quantile
! sell one index
Table 2: Steps of the long strategy
5Since we want to take a long position in the index, we need to detect moments having high probability
of decrease in AV. This happens when the AV reaches levels haven’t been attained for the past year.
We measure these moments using the 99th quantile of the historical AV distribution (step 2 in table 2).
To have an additional signal of a future decrease, we wait until the AV crosses the 99th quantile from
above and open the position (step 3 in table 2). We want to keep the position open until investors fear
has disappeared and while the AV decreases. We deﬁne the exit quantile as the 85th (step 4 in table 2).
Figure 3 decrypts this strategy for on a given position. On October 5th, AV reaches the 99th quantile
and the investor becomes aware. On October 8th, AV crosses the 99th quantile on a downward trend; the
investor goes long in the index. He closes his position on October 25th since the 85th quantile is reached.


























Figure 3: Long strategy
On the left hand-side, the ﬁgure 3 presents the evolution of the 99-quantile (above), the 85-quantile (below) and the abnormal
volatility over a 2 month observation window. The long position is open October 8th (upward triangle) and is closed October
25th(downwardtriangle). On the righthand-side, theﬁgure presents theevolutionof wealthin theportfolioforthesame period.
Moreover, we clearly remark the opposite behaviour of the two time series highlighting the negative correlation property.
The short strategy is symmetric to the long one and can be summarized by the table below:
1. AV is high
! we wait
2. AV reaches the 15th quantile
! warning
3. AV increases over the 15th quantile
! sell one index
4. AV increases over the 30th quantile
! buy back one index
Table 3: Steps of the short strategy
As our trading strategy is based on the volatility mean reversion, we need to ﬁnd an entry quantile which
indicates a high probability of future volatility increase. Since the market can drift for a long period with
a very low volatility, we do not think that the lowest quantiles are very good indicators. Therefore, we
do not chose the 1st quantile as an entry signal for the short strategy. We arbitrarily chose the slightly
6higher 15th quantile as the lowest quantile signaling a return to normal levels of volatility. As in the long
position, we take 15% difference between entry and exit quantiles, hence we exit at the 30th quantile.
The assumptions for the long and short strategies are:
￿ borrowing rate (BR): 9%
￿ lending rate (LR): 5%
￿ beginning capital : $0
￿ long strategy
- gains (losses) are invested at the LR (BR).
- additional (rest) capital needed to buy the share is borrowed at BR (lent at LR).
￿ short strategy
- strategy are invested at the LR (BR).
- money received from shorting the stock is kept by the broker until we buy back the share.
3.2 Results
This section presents results for our strategies: the long 99-85%, the short15-30% and their combination.
Both strategies start on the 22-DEC-1987 and end on the 28-MAR-2003. We start the strategies 500 days
after the ﬁrst observation because we need 250 days to construct the moving average and 250 days for
the quantiles.
















adjusted S&P100 3839 177.51 171.12 174.45 0.87 2.55
long 99-85% 316 267.62 73.32 91.38 1.23 3.60
short 15-30% 557 253.15 21.71 74.43 2.17 6.52
long+short 873 520.77 95.04 138.57 1.87 5.47
Table 4: Summary of P&Ls
Table 4 presents the results of the long 99-85% and short 15-30% strategies as well as the combination. The ﬁrst row gives
results for the adjusted S&P100 (S&P100 minus the compounded interest rate, LR=5%). Columns give number of open days,
the ﬁnal P&L, the mean, the volatility, the skewness and the kurtosis in $ of the strategies.
7Figure 4 shows the daily P&L evolution for the 99-85% strategy. Results are compared with the adjusted
S&P100 index (deﬁned as the buy-and-hold strategy (BH)), that is the value of the index minus the
compounded interest rate at the lending rate (LR=5%) to penalize5 our trading strategy. We take position
only 8% of the time (316 over 3839 days) but the P&L proﬁle clearly shows that the strategy captures
positive index price jumps. Moreover, the strategy performs as well during bullish (1988-2000) and








































Figure 4: strategy 99-85% against the adjusted S&P100
Figure 4 presents the daily P&L evolution for the long strategy 99-85% (below) and the adjusted S&P100 (above). The
observation window ranges from 2-JAN-1987 to 28-MAR-2003. The adjusted S&P100 is deﬁned as the value of the S&P100
index minus the compounded interest rate (LR=5%).
5For our strategy, we used 9% to include the additional return on capital asked for the risk.
8Figure 5 presents the 15-30% daily P&L evolution. The number of open positions represents 14.5% of
the whole period and hence is twice more exposed to market risk. We obtain a negative P&L during
the bullish period with low volatility (13% for 1987-1997 and 22% for 1997-2003). The minimum P&L
reached on the 27-JUNE-1997 is $-45.14. However, for the second part of the observation window, the
strategy P&L increases quickly and reaches $253, $76 higher than a simple BH strategy. The proﬁle of








































Figure 5: strategy 15-30% against the adjusted S&P100
Figure 5 presents the P&L evolution for the short strategy 15-30% (below) and the adjusted S&P100 (above). The observation
window ranges from 2-JAN-1987 to 28-MAR-2003. The adjusted S&P100 is deﬁned as the value of the S&P100 index minus
the compounded interest rate (LR=5%).
9When we combine both strategies, we obtain results given in ﬁgure 6. The P&L underperforms the BH
strategy until mid 2001, but clearly overperforms it in the second part to reach $520, $343 more than
the BH. The combination of a strategy which capture the growth opportunity of the index and a second








































Figure 6: strategy 99-85% + 15-30% against the adjusted S&P100
Figure 6 presents the evolution of the P&L of long 99-85% + short strategy 15-30% (below) and the adjusted S&P100 (above).
The observation window ranges from 2-JAN-1987 to 28-MAR-2003. The adjusted S&P100 is deﬁned as the value of the
S&P100 index minus the compounded interest rate (borrowing=5%).
3.2.1 Robustness
To understand previous results, we analyse the date distribution of entering signals. To do so, we com-
pute cumulative sums of open positions for long and short strategies (see ﬁgure 7). For both strategies,
positions are held throughout the period with a slightly higher proportion at the beginning. Since ﬁgures
4 and 5 have shown that the returns are made on the second part of the trading window our performance
does not come from a long lasting open position during the bullish (bearish) market. Moreover, we notice
that the loss observed at the beginning of the short strategy is mainly due to an open position of 145 days.
The very high volatility during the October 1987 crash has biased our estimator of ’normal’ volatility





















































































Figure 7: Distribution of open positions
Figure 7 presents the cumulative sum of open positions for both strategies analysed in section 3.2. Horizontal segments repre-
sents closed positions. Segments with slope of 1 represents open positions. The observation window ranges from 2-JAN-1987
to 28-MAR-2003.
4 Performance measurement
Since our trading strategyis dynamic and takes open positionsonly 8% and 14% of the whole period, it is
clearly not consistent to compare it with a simple buy-and-hold strategy for which the set of information
does not change over time. When we compute the Sharpe ratio of strategies we are faced with two
additional problems. First, as our strategy needs zero initial investment, movements in the invested share
will affect strongly the value of our portfolio, and hence produce extremely high volatility. Second, even
if our strategy produces mainly positive returns on a position, the induced volatility, in fact beneﬁcial for
the investor, would penalize the Sharpe ratio. To tackle the problem, we have thought to use as a proxy
of risk the variance of negative returns and compute the Sharpe ratio accordingly. However, the lack
of negative returns does not provide accurate estimation of the volatility. Once again, the performance
measure is not relevant. Conscious of these different problems, we decide to focus on a comparative
approach with other quantiles strategies and a bootstrap procedure.
4.1 P&L comparison
In that section, we compare results of our two strategies against all other possible quantile strategies. The
aim is to determine whether trading extremes generates higher returns than comparable strategies. We
perform 54 long strategies with {99, 95, 90, ..., 55%} as entry and {95, 90, ..., 50%} as exit quantile.
Similarly, short strategies are applied with {1, 5, 10, ..., 45%} as entry and {5, 10, ..., 50%} as exit
quantile.
114.1.1 Long strategies
Figure 8 (left) provides ﬁnal P&Ls for all long strategies. The ﬁrst observation is that all strategies
besides the 55-50% have positive P&Ls. It seems that the higher the entrance quantile is, the higher the
ﬁnal P&L. For a zero-investment capital, results range from $-4.28 (55-50%) to $299 (99-50%). Over
all strategies, ﬁnal P&Ls have a mean of $161.7 and a standard deviation of $78.4. In addition, within
each entrance quantile, the lower the exit quantile is, the higher the return. For instance with an entrance
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Figure 8: strategies ﬁnal P&L
The ﬁgure 8 presents ﬁnal P&Ls for all strategies. On the left hand-side, results for long strategies are provided with entry
quantile {99, 95, 90, ..., 55%} noted on the top of the graph. On the right hand-side, results are given for short strategies. Entry
quantiles are given on the top of the graph {1, 5, 10, ..., 45%}.
However, these results have to be analyzed carefully. As each strategy corresponds to a different number
of positions, we should take account for market exposure. Therefore, when we divide the ﬁnal P&L by
the number of days in open position, we clearly see that previous results no longer hold (ﬁgure 9 left).
Here we observe an exponential increase with respect to the entry quantile. Using this criteria, our long
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Figure 9: strategies $P&L per open days
The ﬁgure 9 presents P&Ls per day of open position for all strategies. On the left hand-side, results for long strategies are
provided with entry quantile {99, 95, 90, ..., 55%} noted on the top of the graph. On the right hand-side, results are given for
short strategies. Entry quantiles are given on the top of the graph {1, 5, 10, ..., 45%}.
4.1.2 Short strategies
Figure 8 (right) presents ﬁnal P&Ls for all short strategies. We still observe positive P&Ls for 49 out
of 55 strategies. The general distribution of P&Ls is maximum for strategies entering between 10% and
25% quantiles and looks like an inverted U shaped curve. For a zero-investment capital, results range
from $-65.96 (5-15%) to $302.5 (20-45%). In addition, within each entrance quantile it seems that the
higher the exit quantile, the higher the return. For instance with an entrance quantile at 10%, we obtain
the following P&Ls: {$52, $114, $232, $241, $256, $262, $260, $182}. However for all strategies,
waiting too long (exit at the last 50% quantile) leads to substantial decrease in P&L. When we divide
P&Ls by the number of open days (ﬁgure 9 right), we still keep the inverted U shaped curve. Using this
criteria, our short strategy (15-30%) ranks 7 out of 55.
4.2 Bootstrap procedure
The aim here is to determine whether our trading rule (99-85 and 15-30%) provides good market timing.
To assess this conclusion, we simulate random shifts of our entry dates and compare the cumulative
returns.





ith position. We then construct the
















N is the total number of positions in the strategy. Then, using a resampling procedure based on






days. From the observed returns we calculate the cumulative return
e
R for the series. We repeat this
sampling procedure 20’000 times for both long and short strategies.
Figure 10 presents the cumulative returns for both long and short simulations. Results are very different
for long and short strategies. Market timing is clearly observed for the long strategy, whereas the short







































Figure 10: Bootstrap distributions
Figure 10 presents simulated cumulative returns distributions. 20’000 simulations are performed using Dirichlet algorithm.
















i is the return on the
ith position and
N is the total number of






￿ min 25th 50th 75th max
long 99-85% 1.97 0.91 0.24 0.41 0.76 0.86 0.99 2.61
short 15-30% 1.34 1.25 0.41 0.19 1 1.25 1.51 3.42
Table 5: Results of bootstrap
Table 5 presents a summary of cumulative returns for observed and simulated strategies. The ﬁrst column
R gives cumulative
return for observed strategies.
e
R denotes results for resampling simulation. It gives
￿ the mean,
￿ the standard deviation and
some quantiles of the simulated distribution. The bootstrap procedure was performed 20’000 times.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we try to assess the performance of volatility as leading indicator for future stock returns.
In order to determine future changes in volatility, we use its mean reverting behaviour. Since volatility
will stay bounded, high (low) volatility have a high probability of future decrease (increase). Hence,
extremes are signals for our trading rule.
The two performance measurement made in section 4 reveal different results. For the 99th quantile,
the analysis seems to assess that it is a good indicator of future stock movements. On the contrary,
the 15th quantile ranks 7 out of 55 in short strategies, but has an average performance in the bootstrap
measurement. Therefore we can conclude that low quantiles are weak indicators. This difference can
be explained by two opposite investors behaviour in periods of high and low volatility. Periods of high
volatility are linked to a stress environment and excess fear selling. Hence, the market will jump and
the return to ’normal’ market volatility will be made over a short period of time. On the contrary, when
low volatility is reached, investors will keep their position creating a slow return to ’normal’ market
volatility.
The conclusion of our analysis is that extreme volatility trading is only proﬁtable for high volatility.
Returns of our long strategy could be associated to a ’fear premium’ due to the market riskiness in high
volatility periods. A further step to our paper would be to include the negative impact of risk capital
requirements within the strategy.
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Figure 11: Distribution of the cumulative returns












. The left hand-side shows results for 99-85% long
strategy and the right hand-side for the 15-30% short strategy. We notice here a small number of negative returns for both
strategies.
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